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THE WARREN COURT
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
YALE KAMISAR

M

any commentators have observed that when we speak of "the Warren Court,"
we mean the Warren Court that lasted from 1962 (when Arthur Goldberg
replaced Felix Frankfurter) to 1969 (when Earl Warren retired). 1 But when we speak
of the Warren Court's "revolution" in American criminal procedure we mean the
Warren Court that lasted from 1961 (when the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio 2 was
decided) to 1966 or 1967. 3 In its final years, the Warren Court was not the same
Court that had handed down Mapp or Miranda. 4

The Closing Years of the Warren Era
The last years of the Warren Court constituted a period of social upheaval marked by
urban riots, disorders on college campuses, ever-soaring crime statistics, everspreading fears of the breakdown of public order, and assassinations and nearassassinations of public figures. 5 Moreover, the strong criticism of the Court by
many members of Congress and by presidential candidate Richard Nixon and the
obviously retaliatory provisions of the Crime Control Act of 1968 contributed further to an atmosphere that was unfavorable to the continued vitality of the Warren
Court's mission in criminal cases. 6
In the closing years of the Warren era, the Court upheld the so-called informer's privilege (allowing the government to withhold the identity of its informant
at a suppression hearing);7 rejected the general assumption that errors of constitutional magnitude were not subject to the harmless error rule; 8 emphatically reaffirmed the doctrine that a defendant lacked "standing" to challenge evidence seized
in violation of a third party's constitutional rights9 (although such a requirement
seemed inconsistent with the deterrence theory of the exclusionary rule, which had
gained ascendancy, and most commentators had urged abolition of the "standing"
requirement) 10 and repudiated the "mere evidence" rule, the rule banning the
seizure of objects of "evidentiary value" only, 11 thus clearing the way for a system of
court-ordered electronic surveillance that could satisfy Fourth Amendment standards. 12 (The following year, Congress granted law enforcement authorities broad
ll6
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powers to conduct continuing electronic surveillance for up to thirty days, with
extensions possible). I 3
The Warren Court's performance in the field of criminal procedure does not
fall into neat categories. Criminal defense lawyers did win some victories in the late
1960s, 14 but then they had lost some important cases earlier, 15 when the revolution
in criminal procedure was supposed to be at its peak. Nevertheless, I think that in the
main the revolution ended a couple of years before Earl Warren stepped down as
Chief Justice. 16
The ChiefJustice's majority opinion in Terry v. Ohio 17 an important 1968 "stop
and frisk" case, is a dramatic demonstration of the Warren Court's change in tone
and attitude. Seven years earlier, of course, the Warren Court had imposed the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule on the states as a matter of constitutional
law. 18 But the Court was a good deal less exuberant about the exclusionary rule in
1968, when it upheld the police practice of "stopping" and "frisking" persons on less
than probable cause to believe they were engaged in criminal activity. It recognized,
almost poignantly, that "[t]he exclusionary rule has its limitations . . . as a tool of
judicial control." 19
I truly believe that if, say, in 1971 the Burger Court had written the same
opinion in the "stop and frisk" cases that the Warren Court wrote in 1968, the
Burger Court would have caught heavy fire for leaving the lower courts without
adequate guidance concerning a widespread police practice and that its opinion
would have been considered solid evidence of the emerging counterrevolution in
criminal procedure. 2o
The Warren Court's approach in the 1968 stop-and-frisk cases contrasts sharply
with the approach it had taken only two years earlier in Miranda. 21 There, greatly
troubled by the lower courts' persistence in utilizing the ambiguity of the
"voluntariness"-"totality of the circumstances" test to uphold confessions of doubtful constitutionality, the Court sought to replace the unruly traditional test with a
relatively concrete and easily administered rule. But the stop-and-frisk cases established such a spongy test, one that allowed the police so much room to maneuver
and furnished the courts so few bases for meaningful review, that the opinion must
have been cause for celebration in a goodly number of police stations. 22 (At one
point, for example, the Court said that an officer could frisk when he observes
"unusual conduct" which leads him to conclude that "criminal activity may be
afoot" and that the suspect may be armed and dangerous.)2 3

The Relevance of the Struggle for Civil Rights
As the late A. Kenneth Pye observed in the closing years of the Warren Court era,
"The Court's concern with criminal procedure can be understood only in the
context of the struggle for civil rights." 24 Continued Dean Pye:

It is hard to conceive of a Court that would accept the challenge of guaranteeing
the rights of Negroes and other disadvantaged groups to equality before the law
and at the same time do nothing to ameliorate the invidious discrimination
between rich and poor which existed in the criminal process. It would have
been equally anomalous for such a Court to ignore the clear evidence that mem-
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bers of disadvantaged groups generally bore the brunt of most unlawful police
activity.
If the Court's espousal of equality before the law was to be credible, it
required not only that the poor Negro be permitted to vote and to attend a school
with whites, but also that he and other disadvantaged individuals be able to
exercise, as well as possess, the same rights as the affluent white when suspected
of crime. 25
Moreover, as another commentator pointed out, writing at a time when the
African American's struggle for civil rights and the response to that struggle by law
enforcement officials were still vivid memories:
What we have seen in the South is the perversion of the criminal process into an
instrument of official oppression. The discretion which, we are reminded so
often, is essential to the healthy operation oflaw enforcement agencies has been
repeatedly abused in the South: by police, by prosecutors, by judges and juries . . . . We have had many reminders from abroad that law enforcement
may be used for evil as well as for beneficent purposes; but the experience in the
South during the last decade has driven home the lesson that law enforcement
unchecked by law is tyrannous. 26
When one thinks of "equal justice" the famous Gideon case 27 comes first to
mind, but Miranda should not be overlooked. Especially when viewed against the
background of Escobedo v. Illinois 28 (decided two years earlier), Miranda, too, may
be regarded as an "equal justice" case.
Escobedo extended the role of counsel to the preindictment stage, but it was
unclear whether the right to counsel came into play "when the process shifts from
investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to
elicit a confession" 29 or when the process so shifts and one or more of the limiting
facts in Escobedo are also present. 30 Mr. Escobedo had hired a lawyer (indeed, the
lawyer had arrived in the station house and had tried unsuccessfully to meet with his
client). Moreover, although not advised of his right to counsel, Mr. Escobedo had
requested an opportunity to meet with his lawyer, but that request had been denied.
Although Escobedo grew out of a set of unusual facts, and arguably could be
limited to these facts, the opinion had broad implications and at some places
contained sweeping language. How grudgingly or expansively would the Court read
this case? Would one who, unlike Mr. Escobedo, could not afford to hire a lawyer, 31
get the benefit of Escobedo? Would the person who, unlike Mr. Escobedo, was not
smart enough or alert enough to ask for a lawyer on his own initiative fall under the
protection of Escobedo?
Unhappy with Escobedo and its potential for expansion, many in the "legal
establishment" maintained that the case should be read narrowly or limited to its
special facts. In short, on the eve of Miranda, many were trying to use the inability
to afford a lawyer and the ignorance of one's rights as convenient valves to limit the
impact of a precedent they did not like. 32
As we all know, this attempt failed. As Judge Henry J. Friendly, perhaps the
most formidable critic of the Warren Court's criminal procedure cases, has noted,
the equal protection argument is "a ground bass that resounds throughout the
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Miranda opinion." 33 To quote Judge Friendly, as the Miranda Court saw it,
"Equality [in the interrogation room] could be established only by advancing the
point at which the privilege became applicable and surrounding the poor man with
safeguards in the way of warning and counsel that would put him more nearly on a
par with the rich man and the professional criminal. "34
At her confirmation hearings, it is worth noting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
defended Miranda largely on "equal protection" grounds:
[The Miranda warnings provide information about] constitutional rights that
should be brought home to every defendant.
Now, sophisticated defendants will know them without being told, but the
unsophisticated won't. . . .
. . . [The Miranda rules] provide an assurance that people know their
rights. It is an assurance that the law is going to be administered even-handedly
because, as I said, sophisticated defendants who have counsel ordinarily will
know about their rights. . . . 35

Criticism of Miranda-From Opposite Directions
In Gideon, twenty-two state attorneys general filed an amicus brief on behalf of the
defendant. But in Miranda and its companion cases twenty-six state attorneys general joined in an arnicus brief urging the Supreme Court to "go slow" and to allow
changes in the police-interrogation-confessions area to develop in nonconstitutional
terms. 36 This led one observer to say that "the states had made a U-turn since
Gideon. "37 I think not.
The twenty-two attorneys general who sided with Mr. Gideon did so on the
understanding, inter alia, that the new constitutional right to appointed counsel in
noncapital cases would not "attach" until the judicial process had begun. 38 The
amicus brief concluded by urging the Court to "require that all persons tried for a
felony in state court" be afforded the right to counsel. 39 In Miranda, however, the
attorneys general were afraid that the Court would carry the "equality principle" to
the point where it really bites-the police station.
That is why Gideon was a case that received much applause, but Miranda was
the case that galvanized opposition to the Warren Court into a potent political
force. 40 It cannot be denied that Miranda is a much-maligned case, 41 but it is also a
much misunderstood one.
One source of confusion may have been that the Miranda Court led a goodly
number to believe that it was "building on" and expanding Escobedo when it was
actually making a "fresh start. "42
As already indicated, at some places the majority opinion in Escobedo launched
such a broad attack on the government's reliance on confessions that it threatened (or promised) to eliminate virtually all police interrogation of suspects. At one
point, for example, in the course of rejecting the argument that if a suspect were
entitled to a lawyer prior to indictment or formal charge, the number of confessions
obtained by the police would be greatly reduced, the Escobedo Court retorted: "The
fact that many confessions are obtained during this period points up its critical
nature as a 'stage when legal aid and advice' are surely needed. The right to coun-
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sel would indeed be hollow if it began at a period when few confessions were
obtained. "43
At another point, the Court observed:
We have learned the lesson of history . . . that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the "confession" will, in the long run, be
less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic
evidence independently secured through skillful investigation . . . .
. . . No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is
permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise these
rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a
system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system. 44

The sweeping language and broad implications of Escobedo greatly troubled,
one might even say alarmed, most law enforcement officials and many members of
the bench and bar. Thus, on the eve of Miranda, a case that was to reexamine
Escobedo and to clarify its meaning and scope, the nation's most respected lowercourt judges (Charles Breitel, Henry Friendly, Walter Schaefer, and Roger Traynor)
spoke publicly in anticipation of the Court's ruling and urged the Court to turn back
or at least to reconsider where it was going. 45 Justice Schaefer, for example, voiced
fear that "the doctrines converging upon the institution of police interrogation are
threatening to push on to their logical conclusion-to the point where no questioning of suspects will be permitted. "46 And Judge Friendly warned that "condition[ing}
questioning on the presence of counsel is . . . really saying that there may be no
effective, immediate questioning by the police" and "that is not a rule that society
will long endure. "47
The Warren Court did not turn back, but neither did it hand down a ruling that
these distinguished judges had anticipated and feared. The Court did not flatly
prohibit police questioning of suspects. Nor did it condition such questioning on the
presence of counsel. Nor did it require that suspects be advised of their rights by a
defense lawyer or by a disinterested magistrate.
The Court continued to move in the same general direction as it had in
Escobedo, but it "switched tracks"-it switched from a right-to-counsel rationale
(which threatened to culminate in a right not to confess except with the tactical
assistance of counsel) to a self-incrimination rationale (which gave the police more
room to maneuver). A right-to-counsel rationale had almost no stopping point, but a
self-incrimination rationale did-it required governmental compulsion.
But many members of the media and the public did not realize this. To them
the important point was that the Court had not turned back.
At the time of the decision, many overlooked what has become increasingly
clear in recent years-Miranda was very much a "compromise" between the old
"totality of circumstances" test for admitting confessions and extreme proposals
that-as the fear (or hope) was expressed at the time-would, in effect, have eliminated police interrogation of suspects. As the Court, per Justice O'Connor, pointed
out twenty years after the Miranda case, Miranda "attempted to reconcile"
two "competing concerns"-the need for police questioning as an effective law
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enforcement tool and the need to protect custodial suspects from impermissible
coercion. 48
Miranda left the police free to conduct general on-the-scene questioning even
though the person being questioned was neither informed nor aware of his or her
rights. And even when the suspect was in the station house and police interrogators
were bent on eliciting confessions, it allowed them to obtain waivers of the right to
remain silent and the right to the assistance of counsel (a) without the advice or
presence of counsel, (b) without the advice or presence of a judicial officer, and (c)
without any objective recording of the waiver transaction or the subsequent interrogation. 49
At first Miranda was criticized for going too far. To a considerable extent, this
was a result of the confusion over what the Court actually did. Many thought that
because it had not read Escobedo narrowly, because it had not turned back, the
Court had put additional restraints on the police. In short, to a considerable extent
the Warren Court was criticized for what its critics had anticipated it would do (but
what, it turned out, the Court did not really do).
In recent years, ironically, Miranda has been increasingly criticized for not
going far enough-for example, for not requiring the advice of counsel before a
suspect can effectively waive her rights or for not requiring a tape recording of how
the warnings are delivered and how the suspect responds and, if the suspect does
effectively waive her rights, for not tape recording the police questioning that follows. 50
There is a good deal to be said for this criticism, but these commentators do not
seem to appreciate the fact that in 1966 the Court was barely able to go as far as it
did-that at the time it was probably not possible to persuade a majority of the Court
to go one inch further than it did. 51 Moreover, the liberal critics of Miranda do not
seem to realize that if, for example, the Court had explicitly required the police to
make a tape recording, or even a verbatim stenographic recording, of the crucial
events, it would have added much fuel to the criticism that it was exercising undue
control over police practices-that it was "legislating."

How Did Miranda Fare in the Post-Warren Era?
Because Miranda was the centerpiece of the Warren Court's "revolution" in American criminal procedure and the prime target of those who thought the courts had
become "soft" on criminals, almost all Court watchers expected the so-called Burger
Court to treat Miranda unkindly. They did not have to wait very long.

The Impeachment Cases
The first blows the Burger Court struck Miranda were the rulings in two impeachment cases, Harris v. New York 52 and Oregon v. Hass. 53 The Harris case held that
statements preceded by defective warnings, and thus inadmissible to establish the
government's case-in-chief, could nevertheless be used to impeach the defendant's
credibility if the defendant chose to take the stand in his or her own defense. 54
The Court noted, but seemed unperturbed by the fact, that some language in the
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Miranda opinion could be read as barring the use of statements obtained in violation
of Miranda for any purpose.
The Court went a step beyond Harris in the second impeachment case, Hass.
In this case, after being advised of his rights, the suspect asserted his right to counsel.
Nevertheless, the police refused to honor the request for a lawyer and continued to
question the suspect. The Court ruled that here, too, the resulting incriminating
statements could be used for impeachment purposes. Since many suspects make
incriminating statements even after the receipt of complete Miranda warnings,
Harris might have been explained-and contained-on the ground that permitting
impeachment use of statements required without complete warnings would not
greatly encourage the police to violate Miranda. But in light of the Hass ruling,
when suspects assert their rights, the police seem to have very little to lose and much
to gain by continuing to question them in violation of Miranda. 55
The police need not advise suspects of their rights unless they are about to
subject them to "custodial interrogation." The Burger Court construed the key
concepts "custody" and "custodial interrogation" rather narrowly. If a suspect goes
to the police station alone after an officer requests that he or she meet the officer
there at a convenient time or even if a suspect "voluntarily" agrees to accompany the
police to that site, police station questioning may not be "custodial interrogation"
within the meaning of Miranda. 56

What Is "Interrogation" Within the Meaning of Miranda?
Another frequently litigated issue is what constitutes "interrogation" within the
meaning of Miranda. Considering the alternatives, the Burger Court gave this key
term a fairly generous reading in Rhode Island v. Innis. 57 The Court might have
taken a mechanical approach to Miranda and limited "interrogation," as some
lower courts had, to instances where the police directly address a suspect. Or it might
have limited interrogation to situations where the record establishes that the police
intended to elicit a response, a difficult test for the defense to satisfy. The Court did
neither. Instead, it held that Miranda's safeguards are triggered whenever a person
in custody is subjected either to express questioning or its "functional equivalent""interrogation" includes "any words or actions on the part of the police [other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody] that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. " 58
The meaning of "interrogation" arose in an interesting setting in Illinois v.
Perkins: 59 Suppose a secret government agent, posing as a fellow prisoner, is placed
in the same cell or cell block with an incarcerated suspect and the secret agent
induces the suspect to discuss the crime for which he has been arrested. Does this
constitute "custodial interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda? No, answered
the Perkins Court; "Miranda warnings are not required when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement. "60
Although Perkins has been sharply criticized for giving Miranda an unduly
narrow reading and encouraging the police to use deception in order to obtain
"uninformed confessions,"61 I think the case was correctly decided. It is the impact
on the suspect's mind of the interplay between police interrogation and police
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custody-each condition reinforcing the pressures and anxieties produced by the
other-that makes custodial police interrogation inherently coercive. But in the "jail
plant" situation, there is no interplay between the two conditions where it countsin the mind of the suspect.
Miranda was designed to counter the inherent coercion generated by a policedominated environment. But how can it be said that suspects are enveloped in a
police-dominated atmosphere when they have no idea that the person with whom
they are talking is a police officer or an agent of the police? 62 That is why, I believe,
the Court reached the right result when it concluded that if it is not custodial police
interrogation in the mind of the suspect it is not such interrogation within the
meaning of Miranda. 6 3

The Edwards Case: A Victory for Miranda in the Post-Warren Era
Although in the main the Burger Court interpreted and applied Miranda begrudgingly, the 1981 case of Edwards v. Arizona64 is a notable exception. Unlike
most Miranda cases, which deal with the need for, or the adequacy of, the warnings
or the effectiveness of the suspect's alleged waiver of rights in immediate response to
the warnings, Edwards involved what have been called "second-level" Miranda
safeguards-those procedures Miranda tells us should be followed when suspects do
assert their rights. 65
In Edwards, the Burger Court gladdened the hearts of Miranda supporters by
invigorating that case in an important respect. It held that when a suspect effectively
asserts the right to a lawyer (as opposed to the right to remain silent)66 he may not be
subjected to further police interrogation "until counsel has been made available to
him, unless [he) himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. " 67 In other words, once a suspect effectively exercises the right
to counsel, the police cannot try to change the suspect's mind; they must wait to see
whether she changes her mind on her own initiative. A valid waiver of the right to
counsel cannot be established by showing only that the suspect responded further to
police-initiated custodial interrogation even though she was given a fresh set of
Miranda warnings at a subsequent interrogation session.
Edwards has been called "the Burger Court's first clear-cut victory for Miranda. "68 Indeed, Edwards (and its progeny) may be called the only clear-cut victory
for Miranda since the Warren Court disbanded. It is a formidable rule, one that
must worry every experienced interrogator, and in recent years it has become still
more formidable-in some respects.
The rule applies even when the police want to question a suspect about a crime
unrelated to the subject of their initial interrogation. 69 Moreover, as the Court
recently held in Minnick v. Mississippi, 70 once a suspect invokes the right to counsel
the police may not reinitiate interrogation in the absence of counsel even if the

suspect has been allowed to consult with an attorney in the interim. 71

The Weaknesses in the Edwards Rule
The post-Warren Supreme Court gave us Edwards, but the Court giveth and the
Court taketh away. The Court has created two significant weaknesses in the Edwards
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rule (or, if one prefers to state it another way, allowed two good-sized weaknesses in
the rule to develop).
The Court has told us that even though a suspect had earlier invoked the right to
counsel and at no time had explicitly "invited" or "initiated" conversation about the
subject matter of the case, she may furnish the police an opportunity to recommence
interrogation simply by asking an officer, "What's going to happen to me now?" or
presumably, "What comes next?" 72 Such comments strike me as expressions of
concern, anxiety, or confusion normally attendant to arrest, removal from the scene
of arrest, or transportation to the station house-not evidence of a generalized desire
or willingness to discuss the subject matter of the investigation. Nevertheless, according to the Court, these simple and understandable questions dismantle the
safeguards established by Edwards.
The other substantial gap in the Edwards rule created by the Court (or at least
not filled by it) is the very recent decision in Davis v. United States. 73 In this case the
Court drew a sharp line between those suspects who "clearly" assert their right to
counsel (thereby triggering Edwards) and those who only make an ambiguous or
equivocal reference to an attorney that might or might not be an assertion of the
right to counsel. (E.g., "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" or "Do you think I need an
attorney here?") In the latter situation the police may immediately begin interrogating the suspect without asking any questions designed to clarify whether the suspect
really meant to invoke the right to counsel.
I believe the approach adopted by the Davis Court is unsound. An ambiguous
reference to counsel should not be totally ignored because it fails to satisfy a certain
level of clarity. The police should be required to respond to such references by
asking narrow clarifying questions designed to ascertain whether the suspect actually
wishes to assert his or her right to a lawyer. Otherwise, the right to counsel turns not
on the suspect's choice, but on the clarity with which he or she expresses that
choice. 74
Sociolinguistic research indicates that certain discrete segments of the population (women and a number of minority racial and ethnic groups) are far more likely
than other groups to avoid strong, assertive means of expression and to use indirect
and hedged speech patterns that give the impression of uncertainty or equivocality. 75
Moreover, since the custodial police interrogation setting involves an imbalance of
power between the suspect and his or her interrogator(s), such a setting increases the
likelihood that a suspect will adopt an indirect or hedged-and thus ambiguousmeans of expression. Even within speech communities whose members do not
ordinarily use indirect modes of expression, one who is situationally powerless, that
is, aware of the dominant power of the person he or she is addressing, may also adopt
a hedging speech register.
To borrow a phrase from Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Davis (really a
dissent on this issue), a custodial suspect, one who will usually be experiencing
considerable stress and anxiety, should not be expected or required to "speak with
the discrimination of an Oxford don. "76
Edwards is a formidable rule-if a suspect is lucky enough not to ask an officer
what is going to happen next or careful enough to assert the right to counsel with
sufficient precision and direcmess. The trouble with the rule is that its application
turns on very fine, subtle distinctions-too fine and too subtle for the real world.
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Those suspects who fall under the rule of Edwards will be well protected by its
thick armor. But many similarly situated suspects will fall outside the rule because it
has a soft underbelly.
I am fairly confident that the Court that decided Miranda would have rejected
the exceptions to the Edwards rule that have developed in recent years. On the other
hand, I have to say (and I never thought I would say this about a Miranda case in the
post-Warren Court era), that I think Minnick may go too far in favor of criminal
suspects. 77 To put it another way, I believe at least some members of the Miranda
majority would have balked at the application of the Edwards rule to the Minnick
fact situation.
If a suspect requests a lawyer and, unlike the situation in Edwards and other
cases, the police do as the suspect asks-actually permit or bring about a meeting
between the suspect and his lawyer-why can't the police approach the suspect a
second time and give him a fresh set of warnings? Under these circumstances a
suspect has more reason to believe than most suspects do that if he asserts his right to
counsel at the second session the police will honor that right. They already did so
once before. Why would they not do so again?

What Does It Mean to Say That the Miranda Rules
Are Merely "Prophylactic"?
Although supporters of Miranda were troubled by the "impeachment" cases and by
decisions giving "custody" and "custodial interrogation" a narrow reading, they were
troubled still more by Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Michigan v.

Tucker. 78
Tucker was a mild case of police misconduct-a very attractive case from the
prosecution's point of view. First of all, the police questioning occurred before
Miranda was decided, although the defendant's trial took place afterward. Thus,
Miranda was just barely applicable. 79 Second, Tucker dealt with the admissibility
not of the defendant's own statements-they had been excluded-but only with the
testimony of a witness whose identity had been discovered by questioning the suspect
without giving him a complete set of Miranda warnings.
Under the circumstances, the Court held that the witness's testimony was
admissible. Tucker can be read very narrowly, but the majority opinion contains a
good deal of mischievous broad language.
The Tucker majority seemed to equate the "compulsion" barred by the privilege
against self-incrimination with "coercion" or "involuntariness" under the pre-Miranda "totality of circumstances" test. 80 This is quite misleading. Much harsher
police methods were needed to render a confession "coerced" or "involuntary"
under the pre-Miranda test than are necessary to make a confession "compelled"
within the meaning of the self-incrimination clause. That, at least, is the premise of

Miranda.
That was why the old "voluntariness" test for the admissibility of confessions
was abandoned in favor of Miranda. That is why law enforcement officials so
fiercely resisted the application of the self-incrimination clause to custodial police
interrogation. And that is why, although his questioning had been mild compared
to the oppressive and offensive police methods that had rendered statements inad-
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missible in the older confession cases, Ernesto Miranda's confession was held inadmissible. 81
By lumping together self-incrimination "compulsion" and pre-Miranda "involuntariness" or "coercion" and then declaring that a Miranda violation is not necessarily a violation of the self-incrimination clause-it only is if the confession was
"involuntary" under traditional standards 82-the Tucker majority rejected the core
premise of Miranda. 83 If this view of Miranda were correct, then it is hard to see
what that landmark case would have accomplished by applying the privilege against
self-incrimination to the proceedings in the police station.
There is another troubling aspect to Tucker. In the course of holding that under
the circumstances of the case the witness's testimony was admissible, the Court
"recognized" that the Miranda warnings "were not themselves rights protected by
the Constitution," but only "prophylactic standards" designed to "safeguard" or to
"provide practical reinforcement" for the privilege against self-incrimination. 84 No,
not quite.
The Miranda Court did observe that the Constitution does not "require adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation
process as it is presently conducted," 85 but it quickly added: "However, unless we are
shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of
their [rights] and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise [them], the following safeguards [the Miranda warnings] must be observed. " 86 Moreover, later in the
opinion, the Miranda Court reiterated: "The warnings required and the waiver
necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective
equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statements made by a defendant. "87
A decade after Tucker was decided, first in New York v. Quarles 88 and then in
Oregon v. Elstad, 89 the Court reiterated Tucker's way of looking at, and thinking
about, Miranda. In both Quarles and Elstad the Court underscored the distinction
between actual coercion by physical violence or threats of violence and inherent or
irrebuttably presumed coercion (the basis for the Miranda rules); between statements
that are actually "coerced" or "compelled" and those obtained merely in violation of
Miranda's "procedural safeguards" or "prophylactic rules."
Is it not proper for the Court to assure that any confession is not actually
compelled in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination by establishing
conclusive presumptions and related forms of prophylactic rules to "implement" or
to "reinforce" constitutional protections-in order to guard against actual constitutional violations?
No, maintains Joseph Grano; Miranda, as the Court now characterizes what it
did in that case, is an "illegitimate" decision. 90 "To permit federal courts to impose
prophylactic rules [rules that may be violated without violating the Constitution] on
the states," he contends, is "to say in essence that federal courts have supervisory
power over state courts. "91 According to Grano, the Court lacks constitutional
authority to overturn state convictions when the Constitution has not actually been
violated.
Stephen Schulhofer and David Strauss strongly disagree. "A conclusive presumption of compulsion," maintains Schulhofer, "is in fact a responsible reaction to
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the problems of the voluntariness test, to the rarity of cases in which compelling
pressures are truly absent, and to the adjudicatory costs of case-by-case decisions in
this area. " 92
Supporting Schulhofer, Professor Strauss maintains that prophylactic rules are
"a central and necessary feature of constitutional law. "93 "Under any plausible
approach to constitutional interpretation," continues Strauss, "the courts must be
authorized-indeed, required-to consider their own and the other branches' limitations and propensities when they construct doctrines to govern future cases. "94
According to Strauss, "[I]t makes much more sense to read into the Constitution a
general requirement that its various provisions be interpreted in light of institutional
realities than to insist that these realities be ignored. "95
I agree with Professors Schulhofer and Strauss that it is not inherently improper
for a court to use conclusive presumptions or other kinds of prophylactic rules. I
agree, too, that such rules are a pervasive form of constitutional decision making.
Suppose Miranda had established a rebuttable presumption that any incriminating statements obtained in a custodial setting in the absence of Miranda safeguards (or equally effective procedures) is compelled, but that this presumption
could be overcome if the suspect were a police officer, lawyer, or law student. Such
a presumption would produce the same result a conclusive presumption would in at
least 95 percent of the cases. But so far as I know everybody agrees that a court's
responsibility to achieve accurate fact finding permits it to assign burdens of proof
and to adopt rebuttable presumptions.
As Professor Strauss argues, if it is legitimate for a court to decide that evidence
of voluntariness is legally immaterial in some cases (where the evidence is insufficient to overcome a rebuttable presumption), why should it be-how can it beimproper for a court to extend that approach to all cases?96
Miranda is based on the realization that case-by-case determination and review
of the "voluntariness" of a confession in light of the totality of the circumstances was
severely testing the capacity of the judiciary and that institutional realities warranted
a conclusive presumption that a confession obtained under certain conditions and in
the absence of certain safeguards was compelled. As Schulhofer and Strauss maintain, under any plausible approach to constitutional interpretation, the courts must
be allowed to take into account their fact-finding limitations.
Another word about "prophylactic rules." A few years ago, in Withrow v.
Williams, 97 it is worth recalling, the Court rejected the government's argument that
since Miranda's safeguards "are not constitutional in character, but merely 'prophylactic,'" federal habeas review should not extend to claims based on violations of
these safeguards. 98 The Court, per Justice Souter, accepted the government's characterization of the Miranda safeguards, for purposes of the case, but not its conclusion.
As I read the opinion of the Court in Withrow, it said in effect: Yes, we have
sometimes called the Miranda rules "prophylactic" (because, explained the Court,
violation of these rules might lead to exclusions of a confession "that we would not
condemn as 'involuntary in traditional terms'"), 99 but so what?
The Court went on to say that '"[p]rophylactic' though it may be, . . . Miranda safeguards 'a fundamental trial right' . . . . By bracing against 'the possi-
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bility of unreliable statements in every instance of in-custody interrogation,' [it]
serves to guard against 'the use of unreliable statements at trial. "'JOO
A final word about establishing conclusive presumptions and promulgating
other kinds of prophylactic rules. If, as has been charged, the Warren Court exceeded its constitutional authority in Miranda, then so did the Burger Court (in
Edwards) and the Rehnquist Court (in Roberson and Minnick).
Edwards held, in effect, that when custodial suspects invoke their right to
counsel, thereby expressing their belief that they are incapable of undergoing police
questioning without legal assistance, there is a conclusive presumption that any
subsequent waiver of rights that comes at police instigation, not at the suspects' own
behest, is compelled. IOI In Roberson, which reaffirmed and extended the Edwards
rule, 102 the Court spoke approvingly of "the bright-line, prophylactic Edwards
rule," 103 pointing out that "[w]e have repeatedly emphasized the virtues of a brightline rule in cases following Edwards as well as Miranda. "104
Minnick made the Edwards rule more formidable still. 105 In the course of his
majority opinion in Minnick, Justice Kennedy made a comment about the Edwards
rule that applies to Miranda as well: "The rule ensures that any statement made in
subsequent interrogation is not the result of coercive pressures. Edwards conserves
judicial resources which would otherwise be expended in making difficult determinations of voluntariness. . . . "106
Dissenting in Minnick, Justice Scalia (joined by the Chief Justice), protested
that the Court's ruling "is the latest stage of prophylaxes built on prophylaxes. " 107 As
Justice Scalia described the Miranda-Edwards line of cases: Minnick was a prophylactic rule needed to protect Edwards, which was a prophylactic rule needed to
protect Miranda, which was a prophylactic rule needed to protect "the right against
compelled self-incrimination found (at last!) in the Constitution. " 108
Justice Scalia left no doubt that he was unhappy about the Court building
prophylaxis upon prophylaxis, but I think his description of what the Court did in
Edwards, Roberson, and Minnick is accurate. If the Warren Court went wrong in
Miranda by establishing "prophylactic rules," the Courts that succeeded it have
been repeat offenders.

Why the Initial Hostility to Miranda Has Dissipated
Overruling Miranda seems to be an idea whose time has come and gone. Why is
this?
A major reason why Miranda evoked much anger and caused much concern at
first is that many feared-as the Miranda dissenters led us to believe-that the
landmark decision would strike law enforcement a grievous blow. Few press accounts of the case failed to quote from Justice White's bitter dissent, in the course of
which he asserted that "the rule announced today will measurably weaken the ability
of the criminal law to perform [its] tasks" and result in "a good many criminal
defendants . . . either not [being] tried at all or [being] acquitted if the State's
evidence, minus the confession, is put to the test of litigation. " 109
Moreover, by giving Miranda limited retroactive effect, by applying the new
doctrine to all cases tried after the date of the decision-even though the police
interrogation had taken place and the confessions had been obtained before Miranda
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had been decided 110-the Court "gave the impression that Miranda had affected
police interrogation far more than it actually had." 111 In the weeks immediately
following Miranda, a number of self-confessed killers walked free. Although these
cases were widely publicized, 112 what was rarely made clear to the public was that
the confessions being tossed out "were only a relatively tiny, special group that were
reached retroactively by the Miranda decision." 113
By the early 1970s, "the view that Miranda posed no barrier to effective law
enforcement had become widely accepted, not only by academics but also [by]
prominent law officials." 114 More recently, a special committee of the American
Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section reached the same conclusion. It reported
that "[a] very strong majority of those surveyed-prosecutors, judges, and police
officers-agree that compliance with Miranda does not present serious problems for
law enforcement." 115 Still more recently, the Court, per Justice Souter, observed:
"[In the 27 years since Miranda was decided] law enforcement has grown in constitutional as well as technological sophistication, and there is little reason to believe
that the police today are unable, or even generally unwilling, to satisfy Miranda's
requirements." 116
The initial hostility to Miranda has faded away for another reason. In its early
years, the case generated a considerable amount of confusion and uncertainty. For
example, did it extend to questioning "on the street"? 117 Did it apply to a person
interviewed in her own home by an IRS agent? 118 Two years after Miranda, Judge
Friendly voiced concern that "the Court may be moving toward a position that
compulsion exists whenever an officer makes an inquiry, so that warnings must
always be given."119
But a quarter-century after Miranda, much of the uncertainty it once generated
has largely been dispelled. It is now fairly clear that absent special circumstances
(such as arresting a suspect at gunpoint or forcibly subduing him) police questioning
"on the street" or in a person's home or office is not "custodial." Nor is "roadside
questioning" of a motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop. As a general matter,
the Miranda doctrine has been limited, as Judge Friendly hoped it would be, to the
police station or an equivalent setting. 120
Some of Miranda's harshest critics make no secret of the fact that they are
determined to topple the decision because of its "symbolic status as the epitome of
Warren Court activism in the criminal law area. " 121 The Miranda case is a symbol.
But which way does that cut?
As Stephen Schulhofer has pointed out, symbols are important, especially "the
symbolic effects of criminal procedural guarantees," for they "underscore our societal commitment to restraint in an area in which emotions easily run uncontrolled. " 122 Even Gerald Caplan, one of Miranda's strongest critics, recognizes that
the case may be seen as "a gesture of government's willingness to treat the lowliest
antagonist as worthy of respect and consideration. " 123

Should the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations Be Admissible?
Although it is highly unlikely that Miranda will be overruled, the Rehnquist Court
may yet strike Miranda a heavy blow-by ruling that all the clues and physical
evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda violation are admissible. The Court has
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not quite said this yet, but it came close to doing so in Oregon v. Elstad (1985). 124 In
that case, in the course of ruling that the fact that the police had earlier obtained a
statement from the defendant in violation of his Miranda rights did not bar the use
of a second confession obtained when the police did comply with Miranda, the
Court indicated that the "fruits" of Miranda violations should be admissible whether
they are a second confession, a witness, or "an article of evidence. " 125
Nietzche once observed that the commonest stupidity consists in forgetting
what one is trying to do. 126 What was the Miranda Court trying to do? It was trying
to take away the police's incentive to exploit a suspect's anxiety and confusion by
implying that they have a right to an answer and that it will be worse for the suspect if
she does not answer. 127 How could we expect the police to comply with Miranda if
we were to prohibit only confessions obtained in violation of that doctrine, but allow
the use of everything these confessions brought to light? 128
As one commentator recently noted: "Expert interrogators have long recognized, and continue to instruct, that a confession is a primary source for determining
the existence and whereabouts of the fruits of a crime such as documents or
weapons. " 129

The Lineup Cases: The Warren Court Decisions
That Suffered the Cruelest Fate
Unlike the Warren Court's most publicized criminal procedure rulings, Mapp and
Miranda, the lineup cases were explicitly designed to protect the innocent from
wrongful conviction. Ironically, these were the Warren Court decisions that suffered
the worst treatment at the hands of the Burger Court.
Although mistaken identification has probably been the single greatest cause of
conviction of the innocent, 130 surprisingly the Supreme Court did not come to grips
with this problem until the closing years of the Warren tenure. Then the Court
seemed to make up for lost time.
In a 1967 trilogy of cases, United States v. Wade, Gilbert v. California, and
Stovall v. Denno, 131 the Court leapfrogged case-by-case analysis of various pretrial
identification situations and applied the right to counsel to identification in one
dramatic move. "Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice [in] the
pretrial lineup, which [absent counsel's presence] may not be capable of reconstruction of trial," the Court deemed counsel's presence essential to "avert prejudice and
assure a meaningful confrontation at trial." 132
Although the pretrial identification in Wade and Gilbert occurred after the
defendants had been indicted, nothing in the Court's reasoning suggested that an
identification that takes place before a defendant is formally charged is less riddled
with dangers or less difficult for a suspect to reconstruct without the presence of
counsel than one occurring after that point. Nevertheless, in Kirby v. Illinoisl3 3 the
Burger Court announced a "post-indictment" rule, one that enables law enforcement officials to avoid the impact of the Wade-Gilbert rule by conducting identification procedures before formal charges are filed.
Nor is that all. A year after Kirby, the Burger Court struck the Wade-Gilbert
rule another heavy blow. Although the defendant made a forceful argument that the
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availability of the photographs at trial furnished no protection against the suggestive
manner in which they may have been originally shown to the witness or the comments of gestures that may have accompanied the display, the Court held in United
States v. Ash 134 that the Wade-Gilbert right to counsel did not apply to a pretrial
photo-identification procedure-even though the procedure was conducted after the
suspect had been indicted and even though the suspect could have appeared in
person at a lineup.
Taken together, Kirby and Ash virtually demolished the original lineup decisions. Nevertheless, in-theory abuses in photographic displays and in preindictment
lineups are not beyond the reach of the Constitution: a defendant may still convince
a court that the circumstances surrounding his identification present so "substantial"
a "likelihood of misidentification" as to violate due process. 135 But the Burger Court
made this quite difficult to achieve.
Although it ought to suffice, an "unnecessarily suggestive" identification is not
enough-the "totality of circumstances" may still permit the use of identification
evidence if, despite the unnecessary "suggestiveness," "the out-of-court identification possesses certain features of reliability. " 136 This is an elusive, unpredictable
case-by-case test that, as might be expected, has not turned out to be any more
manageable for the courts or any more illuminating for law enforcement officers
than the pre-Miranda "totality of the circumstances"-"voluntariness" test. 13 7
The Burger Court's decisions concerning pretrial identification may well be the
saddest chapter in modern American criminal procedure. The Burger Court was
"far more impressed than its predecessor with the importance of the defendant's
guilt," 138 but its harsh treatment of the 1967 lineup cases indicates its willingness to
subordinate even the reliability of the guilt-determining process to the demands for
speed and finality.

Search and Seizure in the Post-Warren Era:
A Prolonged Campaign of "Guerilla Warfare"
When the Burger Court handed down the Kirby and Ash decisions it demonstrated
how quickly and effectively it could cripple a disfavored Warren Court precedent
(without flatly overruling it), but this development constituted an exception to the
Burger Court's general approach in criminal procedure. In the main, in place of the
counterrevolution in criminal procedure that many expected, "the Burger Court
waged a prolonged and rather bloody campaign of guerrilla warfare. " 139 This observation applies with special force to the law of search and seizure.
There are two principal ways to reduce the impact of Mapp v. Ohio: (1) by
narrowing the thrust of the exclusionary rule, that is, by restricting the circumstances in which evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be
excluded, and (2) by shrinking the scope of the amendment itself (e.g., diluting what
amounts to "probable cause," making it easy for the police to establish "consent" to
what would otherwise be an illegal search, and taking a grudging view of what
constitutes a "search" or "seizure"), thereby giving the police more leeway to investigate crime and the defense fewer opportunities to invoke the exclusionary rule. On a
few occasions the post-Miranda Court did decide some search-and-seizure cases
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in favor of the defense, 140 but in the main it substantially reduced the impact
of the exclusionary rule both by cutting back on the application of the rule itself
and by downsizing the scope of the protection against unreasonable search and
seizure.

The "Deterrence" Rationale Comes to the Fore
For much of its life, the "federal" or "Fourth Amendment" exclusionary rule, first
promulgated in the famous 1914 Weeks case, 141 rested not on the empirical proposition that it actually deterred illegal searches, but on what might be called a "principled basis." That principle was to avoid "sanctioning" or "ratifying" the police
lawlessness that produced the proffered evidence, to keep the judicial process from
being contaminated by partnership in police misconduct and, ultimately, to remind
the police and assure the public that the Court took constitutional rights seriously. 142 That view-what might be called the "original understanding" of the
exclusionary rule-is the dominant theme of Mapp v. Ohio. 143
But in the post-Warren Court era, ways of thinking about the exclusionary rule
changed. The "deterrence" rationale, and its concomitant "interest balancing,"
bloomed. Thus, whether the exclusionary rule should be applied was said to present
a question "not of rights but of remedies"-a question to be answered by weighing
the "likely 'costs"' of the rule against its "likely 'benefits. "' 144 By "deconstitutionalizing" the rule-by shifting the nature of the debate from arguments about
constitutional law and judicial integrity to arguments about "deterrence" and empirical data-the critics of the exclusionary rule won some important victories. 145
This is hardly surprising. The "costs" of the exclusionary rule are immediately
apparent-the "freeing" of a "plainly guilty" drug dealer-but the "benefits" of the
rule are much less concrete. As Professor Schulhofer has observed, "[The benefits]
involve safeguarding a zone of dignity and privacy for every citizen, controlling
abuses of power, preserving checks and balances. One could view these as pretty
weighty benefits, perhaps even invaluable ones. But the Court has viewed them as
abstract, speculative. ",46
It is difficult to read the post-Warren Court's search-and-seizure cases without
coming away with the feeling that it did its "balancing" in an empirical fog and that
its cost-benefit analysis-although it sounds objective, even scientific-simply gave
back the values and assumptions the Court fed into it. Thus, if one takes the position
that "no empirical researcher . . . has yet been able to establish with any assurance whether the [exclusionary] rule has a deterrent effect even in the situations in
which it is now applied," 147 as the post-Warren Court does, and one characterizes
the rule's social costs as "substantial," "well known," and "long-recognized," 148 as
the post-Warren Court also did, 149 the outcome is quite predictable.
Yet is not all the talk about the "substantial costs of the exclusionary rule"
misleading? Is it not the Fourth Amendment itself, rather than the exclusionary rule,
that imposes these costs? The "substantial costs" said to be exacted by the exclusionary rule would also be exacted by any other means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment that worked. A society whose police obey the Fourth Amendment in the first
place "pays the same price" as the society whose police cannot use the evidence they
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obtained because they violated the Fourth Amendment: both societies convict fewer
criminals.
If a society relies on the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment,
some "guilty" defendants will not be convicted. If a society relies on a viable
alternative means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment, however (and critics of
the exclusionary rule have often assured us that the alternatives they have in mind
would be at least equally effective), then "guilty" defendants will not be set freebut only because they will not be searched unlawfully in the first place. 150 The only
time the Fourth Amendment would not impose the "substantial societal costs" that
critics of the exclusionary rule complain about would be if the Amendment were
converted into "an unenforced honor code that the police could follow in their
discretion." 151

The Leon Case: The Court Adopts a So-Called
Good Faith Exception
The "deterrence" rationale and its concomitant "cost-benefit" or "balancing approach" to the exclusionary rule reached a high point in United States v. Leon
( 1984), 152 the case that adopted a so-called good faith (actually a "reasonable mistake") exception to the exclusionary rule. In Leon the Court held that what it called
the "marginal or nonexistent" benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained
in objectively reasonable but mistaken reliance on a subsequently invalidated search
warrant "cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion. "153
Although Leon may appear to be little more than a routine application of the
"cost-benefit" approach utilized in earlier cases, it is not. The earlier cases 154 were
based on the assumption that the exclusionary rule-fully applicable in a criminal
prosecution against the direct victim of a Fourth Amendment violation-need not
also be applied in certain "collateral" or "peripheral" contexts because "no significant additional increment of deterrence [was] deemed likely." 155
Leon was a search warrant case, and there is a good deal to be said for confining
the "good faith" exception to the warrant setting. 1 s6 But the case must be read in
light of the Burger Court's general hostility to the exclusionary rule, and the Court's
doubts that "the extreme sanction of exclusion," as the Court called it in Leon, 157
can "pay its way" in any setting, let alone a setting where the Fourth Amendment
violations are neither deliberate nor "substantial." In the future, I fear, the Rehnquist Court may say that the same cost balancing that led to the admissibility of the
evidence in Leon supports a "good faith" exception across the board. It is hard to
believe that the Court adopted such an exception in Leon only to limit it to the tiny
percentage of police searches conducted pursuant to warrants.
The Leon decision is especially hard to defend in light of a decision the Court
rendered only a year earlier, Illinois v. Gates, 158 a case that dismantled the existing
probable cause structure in favor of a mushy "totality of the circumstances" test. The
Gates Court made it fairly clear that "probable cause" is something less than "more
probable than not" (although how much less is anything but clear). At one point, the
Gates Court told us that "probable cause requires only a probability or substantial
chance of criminal activity."159
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What Is a "Search" or "Seizure"? The Court
Takes a Grudging View
"Probable cause" is the heart of the Fourth Amendment. But diluting the standard
of probable cause is only one way that the post-Warren Court has reduced the
protection against unreasonable search and seizure. "Search" and "seizure" are key
words-and key concepts. For police practices need not be based on individualized
suspicion or conducted pursuant to search warrants-indeed, are not regulated by
the Fourth Amendment at all-unless they are classified as "searches" or "seizures."
Thus another way to diminish the security against unreasonable search and seizure
is to take a narrow, stingy view of what amounts to a "search" or "seizure." The
Burger and Rehnquist Courts have done just that.
Thus, because, according to the Court, a depositor who reveals her affairs to a
bank "assumes the risk" that this information will be conveyed to the government,
she has no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the checks and deposit slips she
exposes to bank employees in the ordinary course ofbusiness. 160 Similarly, because,
we are told, one who uses the phone "assumes the risk" that the telephone company
will reveal to the police the numbers she dialed, the government's use of a pen
register (a device that records all numbers dialed from a given phone and the time
they were dialed, but does not overhear oral communications) is not a search or
seizure either. 161 Thus, so far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned, the police
need neither a warrant nor probable cause nor, presumably, any cause, to use such a
device.
Asks Tracey Maclin: "Does the Court really believe that we have no sense of
privacy in the telephone numbers we dial from our homes or in the financial records
we deposit in the bank? . . . How would you feel if, during your drive to work, the
radio station began broadcasting the telephone numbers you had dialed over the last
month? Or if, while reading the morning newspaper, you saw copies of all the
checks you had written during the past year?" 162
What makes the "assumption of risk" in these cases voluntary? If you want to
participate in modern American life at all, do you not have to assume these risks? 163
Although one takes sufficient precautions (for example, erects a fence and posts
warning signs) to render entry on one's private land a criminal trespass under state
law, police entry on and examination of that land is beyond the curtilage and thus
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. 164 Moreover, even land admittedly within
the curtilage (for example, a fenced-in backyard) may not come within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the Court informed a marijuana-growing
defendant that the Constitution failed to protect him against police aerial surveillance because, even though he had completely enclosed his backyard with two high
fences, he had "knowingly exposed" it to the public. 165 Evidently he should have
placed an opaque dome over his backyard.
An examination of a person's trash bags can reveal intimate details about that
person's business dealings, political activities and associations, consumption of alcohol, and sexual practices. (Archaeologists tell us that if we want to find out what is
really going on in a community, we should look at its garbage.) Nevertheless, the
Rehnquist Court held that the police may rip open the sealed opaque trash bags one
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leaves at the curb for garbage pick-up and rummage through their contents for
evidence of crime without engaging in a "search. " 166 Thus this police investigatory
technique, too, is completely uncontrolled by the Constitution.
The Rehnquist Court has also given the crucial term "seizure" a narrow reading. In 1991, for example, the Court told us that if armed police board an interstate
bus at a scheduled intermediate stop, announce their mission is to detect drug
traffickers, randomly approach a passenger, ask to see his bus ticket and driver's
license, and then ask permission to search his luggage-a police practice that some
lower courts "have compared to the tactics employed by fascist and totalitarian
regimes of a bygone era" 167-no "seizure" takes place. Under these circumstances,
the Court told us, a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter or
to ignore the police presence and go about his or her business. 168 In other words, we
are supposed to believe that with a police officer towering over him and at least
partially blocking the narrow bus aisle, a reasonable bus passenger would feel free to
just say no. We are supposed to believe that with a police officer "in his face," a
reasonable passenger would feel free to tell the officer that he wanted to finish
reading a Sports Illustrated article or return to the crossword puzzle he was working
on--0r just go to sleep.

What Constitutes a "Consent" to an Otherwise Illegal Search
or Seizure? The Court Takes a Relaxed View
Although the post-Warren Courts have taken a grudging view of what constitutes a
"search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, they have
taken a relaxed view of what constitutes a consent to an otherwise illegal search or
seizure. "Consent" is law enforcement's trump card. It is the easiest and most
propitious way for the police to avoid the problems presented by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the protection afforded by the Amendment will vary greatly depending
on how difficult or easy it is for the police to establish consent. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte 169 made it all too easy.
If an officer lacks authority to conduct a search, he may request permission to
search, but he cannot demand it. To many people who confront the police, however, the distinction is very thin--0r nonexistent. "[W]hat on their face are merely
words of request take on color from the officer's uniform, badge, gun and demeanor." 170
All the police have to do to make the distinction between "request" and "demand" meaningful is to advise a person that he has a right to refuse an officer's
"request" and that such a refusal will be respected. But the Schneckloth Court
dismissed such a requirement as "thoroughly impractical. " 171 That such a warning
would undermine what the Court called "the legitimate need for [consent]
searches" 172 is quite clear; that such a warning would be "impractical" (as that word
is normally defined) is not at all clear.
After Schneckloth, a person may effectively consent to a search even though he
was never informed-and the government has failed to demonstrate that he was ever
aware-that he had the right to refuse the officer's "request" to search his person,
automobile, or home. After Schneckloth, the criminal justice system, in one impor-
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tant respect a least, can (to borrow a phrase from Escobedo) "depend for its continued
effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional
rights." 173
More recently, in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 174 the Rehnquist Court held that a
warrantless entry of one's home is valid when the police reasonably, but mistakenly,
believe that a third party (in this case, a girlfriend who had in fact moved out of the
apartment) possesses common authority over the premises. Thus, even though (a)
no magistrate has authorized the search, (b) no probable cause supports the search,
and (c) no exigency requires prompt action, the police may invade a person's home
on the basis of the "seeming consent" of a third party.
The Rodriguez dissenters forcefully argued that when confronted with the
choice of relying on the consent of a third party or obtaining a warrant, the police
"should secure a warrant and must therefore accept the risk of error should they
instead choose to rely on consent. " 175 But the majority was not impressed: "What [a
person] is assured by the Fourth Amendment . . . is not that no government
search of his house will occur unless he consents; but that no such search will occur
that is 'unreasonable'" 176-and a search is not unreasonable when the police "reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who has consented to their
entry is a resident of the premises. "177

Is the Exclusionary Rule the Enemy
of the Fourth Amendment?
A critic of the exclusionary rule might take all the search-and-seizure cases I have
discussed (as well as others I have not) and throw them back at me. All that I have
demonstrated, she might say, is that the exclusionary rule is the enemy of the Fourth
Amendment. For the rule puts tremendous pressure on the courts to avoid "freeing a
guilty defendant" and the courts respond by watering down the rules governing
search and seizure. If the exclusionary rule had not been imposed on the states, she
might argue, the Fourth Amendment would never have been construed as narrowly
as it has been.
But a meaningful tort remedy or any other effective alternative to the exclusionary rule would also put strong pressure on the courts to water down the rules
governing search and seizure. As Monrad Paulsen pointed out shortly before the
Mapp case was decided, "Whenever the rules are enforced by meaningful sanctions,
our attention is drawn to their content. The comfort of Freedom's words spoken in
the abstract is always disturbed by their application to a contested instance. Any rule
of police regulation enforced in fact will generate pressures to weaken the rule. " 178
Disparaging the exclusionary rule, Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo once
said of it: "The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered. " 179 This is
the most famous criticism of the rule and surely the best one-sentence argument ever
made against it. Cardozo made this statement some seven decades ago, but it would
make a snappy ten-second "sound bite" today.
In the post-Warren Court era, however, the criminal has "gone free" less and
less because the exclusionary rule has been greatly narrowed by a "good faith"

The Warren Court and Criminal Justice

•

137

exception and other restrictions and because, as I have tried to show, the scope of the
Fourth Amendment itself has shrunk quite significantly.
Seven decades ago, when Cardozo delivered his famous one-liner (and, I am
willing to concede, even three decades ago, when the Warren Court imposed the
exclusionary rule on the states), the law of search and seizure probably did unduly
restrict the police-on paper. But Mapp v. Ohio has had a large impact. Whether or
not the Warren Court intended this result or foresaw it, Mapp and its progeny have
brought about a great clarification and simplification of the law of search and
seizure-almost always in favor of the police.
This is probably the price we have had to pay for the exclusionary rule-or the
price we would have had to pay for any remedy that actually worked. But that price
has been paid.
Cardozo's famous epigram is outdated. The time has come to revise it. And, as
revised, that epigram becomes a powerful argument in favor of the exclusionary rule:
Nowadays, the criminal does not "go free" because the constable has made an
honest blunder or a technical one. The post-Mapp cases have provided the police
with so much room to operate without fear of the exclusionary rule that nowadays
the criminal only "goes free" if and when the constable has -fl.outed the Fourth
Amendment-if and when he has blundered badly.

The "Selective Incorporation" Doctrine-And Its Impact
on the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule
The "total incorporation" doctrine-the view, advocated most notably by Justice
Hugo Black, 180 that the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates" all of the guarantees found in the Bill of Rights and applies them to the states in the same manner
that they apply to the federal government-has never commanded a majority. 181
But during the Warren Court era the "selective incorporation" doctrine came to the
fore, and, as a practical matter, produced the same results the "total incorporation"
doctrine would have brought about. 182
Under the "selective incorporation" approach, "[o]nce the Court had determined, upon analysis of the whole of a [Bill of Rights] guarantee, that the guarantee
protected a fundamental right, that guarantee 'would be enforced against the States
under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards [that apply]
against federal encroachment. "' 183 In less than a decade, in a series of cases beginning with Mapp, "the Court's conception of what was fundamental was expanded to
include all the significant provisions of the Bill of Rights. "184
In Malloy v. Hogan, 185 holding that the privilege against self-incrimination was
a fundamental right and thus safeguarded against state action under the applicable
federal standard of the Fifth Amendment, the Warren Court "undisputably established that selective incorporation had become the majority view." 186 As Professors
Lafave and Israel have observed:
A series of cases decided during the remainder of the decade reaffirmed the
position taken in Malloy. Those cases held applicable to the states, under the
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to a speedy trial, to a trial by jury, to confront opposing witnesses, and to
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy. In each case, the Court relied squarely upon a
selective incorporation analysis. Moreover, in Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court
noted that . . . the crucial issue was not whether a particular guarantee was
fundamental to every "fair and equitable" criminal justice system "that might be
imagined," but whether it was fundamental "in the context of the criminal
processes maintained by the American states." 187

The fact that the "incorporated" Bill of Rights guarantee applied to the states to
the same extent that it applied to the federal government had an unfortunate side
effect-one that Justice John Harlan, a formidable critic of "selective incorporation," was quick to flag. The only way to "temper" the "incorporated" Bill of Rights
provision in order to "allow the States more elbow room," Harlan pointed out, was
to dilute the federal guarantee itself. 188 Thus the many Supreme Court cases arising
from state courts that narrowly and grudgingly interpret the scope of the protection
against unreasonable search and seizure apply to federal, as well as state, prosecutions. Nor is that all.
Although Justice Tom Clark, the author of the Mapp opinion, presented as
many reasons for the exclusionary rule as he could possibly muster, 189 his essential
position, as Francis Allen observed at the time, was that "the exclusionary rule is
part of the Fourth Amendment; the Fourth Amendment is part of the Fourteenth;
therefore the exclusionary rule is part of the Fourteenth. " 190 As a result, critics of
Mapp had to direct their fire at the efficacy, validity, and constitutional basis of the
"federal" or "Fourth Amendment" exclusionary rule itself, that is, the longestablished rule excluding illegally seized evidence in federal prosecutions. This they
have done with great force and considerable success.
At the time of Mapp, the "federal exclusionary rule" seemed quite secure. 191
But the "storm of controversy" over Mapp engulfed the "federal exclusionary rule"
as well. 192 Thus the future of the 1914 federal rule, which had seemed so bright
before the Warren's Court's revolution in criminal procedure got under way, is now
rather clouded.
Another word about the exclusionary rule-both the Fourth Amendment kind
and the Fourteenth Amendment variety. The reasoning the post-Warren Court has
employed in the search-and-seizure cases outruns the results that have been reached
to date. If, as the Court has told us, any search-and-seizure exclusionary rule must
"pay its way" by deterring official misconduct 193 and if, as it has also told us, the
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule has never been established (to the satisfaction of the post-Warren Court at any rate), 194 why stop with only a narrowing of the
exclusionary rule? Why not abolish the rule altogether?
Fortunately, law is not a syllogism. I very much doubt that the current Court
will carry the way it talks about, and thinks about, the search-and-seizure exclusionary rule to its logical conclusion. I believe rather that a majority of the Justices are
prepared to "live with" what they would probably call a "pruned" exclusionary rule
and a "workable" Fourth Amendment (or what I would call a "battered" exclusionary rule and a "shrunken" Fourth Amendment).

The Warren Court and Criminal /ustice

•

139

The principal danger lies elsewhere. Now that the search-and-seizure exclusionary rule rests on an "empirical proposition" rather than a "principled basis"now that application of the exclusionary rule presents a question not of "rights" but
of "remedies"-the rule is almost defenseless against congressional efforts to repeal it
(most likely by a statute that would purport to replace the rule with what we shall be
assured is an "effective" tort remedy).

Why Was Gideon Warmly Applauded, But Mapp
and Miranda Widely Criticized?
So far, I have said nothing about the famous Gideon case, 195 the only Warren Court
criminal procedure decision in favor of criminal defendants that was greeted by
widespread applause. What accounts for Gideon's popularity?
An untrained, unrepresented, and often uneducated person trying to defend
himself as best he can in a public courtroom makes a highly visible and most
disconcerting spectacle. But few of us have ever seen or thought much about the
plight of an individual who is being searched illegally in a poor neighborhood or
"grilled" vigorously in the backroom of a police station.
Many of the people who accepted the Gideon principle "in principle" soon
qualified their support or withdrew it completely when the Warren Court applied
the principle to the point where it really bites-to custodial interrogation. Thurman
Arnold may have provided as good an explanation as any for why Gideon received a
warm reception but Mapp and Miranda evoked a hostile reaction. And Arnold
made the point long before the Warren Court ever assembled. Too many people, he
commented, are roused by any violation of "the symbol of a ceremonial trial," but
"left unmoved by an ordinary nonceremonial injustice." 196

Is Any Decision Restricting Police Powers
Likely to be Criticized?
It was not the Warren Court's efforts to strengthen the rights of the accused in the
courtroom, but its "activism" in the pre-trial "police practices" area that led many to
believe that it was "too soft" on crime. It was the Court's search-and-seizure and
confession cases that made it a major political issue in the 1968 presidential campaign.
It is hard to think of a single significant ruling against the police by any Supreme
Court that has not evoked strong criticism. And the criticism has come from opposite
directions. Either we are told that the ruling turns too heavily on the particular facts
of the case and thus fails to provide clear-cut guidance for the future or we are told
that the ruling is too broad and inflexible and thus demonstrates that the Court is
acting like a legislature rather than a court. Almost every Supreme Court decision
that has imposed some restraints on law enforcement can be, and I believe has been,
criticized on one of these grounds or the other.
Is it any wonder that one gets the uncomfortable feeling that the police just want
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the Court to go away? That they resent and resist any external control-whether it
comes from a civil rights commission or a civilian review board or a court?
When Escobedo was decided in 1964, it was severely criticized for being much
too fuzzy-although it contained some sweeping language it also contained very
narrow language that arguably limited the case to its special facts. 197 Then came
Miranda. The Miranda Court seemed to be responding to the criticism of Escobedo.
This time it seemed to be striving hard to provide the guidance it had failed to furnish
in Escobedo. But this time the Justices caught heavy fire for not handling the cases
before them on an individualized basis, but providing too much guidance in the
abstract; for deciding too many things in "one gulp"; and for promulgating rules that
were too specific, too rigid, and too inflexible.
The requirement that the police issue the now-familiar warnings and obtain
valid waivers before subjecting a custodial suspect to interrogation is probably the
feature of the Miranda case that has caught the heaviest fire. But this aspect of the
case should have disturbed law enforcement officials the least.
As Professor Schulhofer has pointed out, three distinct steps were involved in
Miranda: (1) informal pressure to speak (i.e., pressure not backed by legal process or
any formal sanction) can constitute "compulsion" within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment; (2) this element of informal compulsion is present, indeed inherent, in
custodial interrogation; and (3) the specified warnings or some equally effective
alternative device is needed to dispel the pressure of custodial interrogation. 198
The first two steps constitute "the core of Miranda." 199 If it had stopped with
the first two steps and left law enforcement officials to guess at what countermeasures
were needed to dispel the pressure of custodial interrogation, the Court would have
incurred far more criticism. 200
The required warnings may be too feeble a means of dispelling the pressure but it
is hard to criticize the warnings on the ground that they "handcuff' the police. It
would be more accurate to say that they serve to liberate the police. They enable the
police to question a custodial suspect without running afoul of the Fifth Amendment. 201

Did the Warren Court's Reform Effort Come at a Bad Time?
Could It Have Come at a Better Time?
In his lively book, The Self-Inflicted Wound (an account of the Warren Court's
revolution in criminal procedure), former New York Times Supreme Court reporter
Fred Graham observes: "History has played cruel jokes before, but few can compare
with the coincidence in timing between the rise in crime, violence and racial
tensions [and] the Supreme Court's campaign to strengthen the rights of criminal
suspects against the state . . . . The Court's reform effort could have come at
almost any time in the recent past . . . [at a time] when it could have taken root
before crime became the problem that it has become. "202
When was that? According to the media, the claims of law enforcement officials, and the statements of politicians, we have always been experiencing a "crime
crisis"--at no time in our recent, or not-so-recent, past has there been a time when
"society" could afford a strengthening or expansion of the rights of the accused. 203
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In 1943 the Court held in McNabb v. United States, 204 in the exercise of
its supervisory authority over the administration of federal criminal justice, that
voluntary confessions should be excluded from evidence if they were obtained
while the suspect was being held in violation of federal requirements that arrestees
be promptly taken before a committing magistrate. The McNabb Court tried to do
for the federal courts what, a quarter-century later, Miranda was designed to do for
state, as well as federal, courts: bypass the frustrating "swearing contests" over the
nature of the secret interrogation and reduce, if not eliminate, both police temptation and opportunity to coerce incriminating statements. The McNabb doctrine
sought to do so by focusing on a relatively objective factor-the length of time a
suspect was held by the police before being brought to a judicial officer to be advised
of his rights.
Although it placed lesser restrictions on federal police than Miranda was to
place on all police a quarter-century later, the McNabb rule was severely criticized
by many law enforcement authorities and many members of Congress for barring
the use of voluntary confessions. For example, in his testimony before a House
subcommittee, the then head of the District of Columbia Police Department called
McNabb "one of the greatest handicaps that has ever confronted law enforcement
officers. " 205
Police officials and politicians were not the only ones unhappy with the
McNabb decision. Most of the judges of the lower federal courts "were unsympathetic, if not openly hostile, toward a rule which suppressed evidence not only
relevant but also cogent and often crucial in order to effectuate what seemed to them
to be an exaggerated concern for individual rights. " 206
A year after the McNabb decision, at a time when a bill to repudiate it was
gathering much support, the Court took another look at the doctrine in the Mitchell
case. 207 With one eye on Congress, and stung by strong criticism from the bench
and bar, as well as from police and prosecutors, the Court backed off; it wrote an
opinion that could be read as limiting McNabb to its particular facts. zos
As James Hogan and Joseph Snee, coauthors of the leading article on the
McNabb doctrine, have noted: "The Supreme Court's decision in the Mitchell case
sent the McNabb rule into eclipse. To the judges of the lower federal courts, who
had viewed the earlier decision with ill-concealed astonishment and apprehension,
the Mitchell case signaled a face-saving retreat by the Court from the untenable
position which it had occupied the year before. "209
Some years later, the Court revived and reaffirmed McNabb, first in Upshaw v.
United States 2IO and then in Mallory v. United States2 11 (from 1957 on, the rule
was often called the McNabb-Mallory rule or simply the Mallory rule), but the
storm of controversy over the rule never subsided:
The Mallory decision was greeted by law enforcement officials of the District of
Columbia (where its impact was greatest) with something bordering on panic.
The Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department declared (hyperbolically, it is
hoped) that the decision renders the Police Department "almost totally ineffective." There were loud demands for a legislative re-examination of the law of
arrest, and in the Congress bills were introduced either to expand the period of
allowable detention or to abolish the McNabb rule itself. 212
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More bills were introduced to repeal, or at least soften, the doctrine, and in
1968 a law was finally enacted that badly crippled it. 213 (Because the McNabbMallory doctrine was a rule of evidence formulated in the exercise of the Court's
supervisory authority over the administration of federal criminal justice, it was
subject to repeal or revision by the Congress.)
The experience with the McNabb-Mallory rule is strong evidence that the
1940s and 1950s were hardly auspicious times for the Court to do what it was to do in
Miranda-deem custodial interrogation by state police, as well as federal, "inherently coercive." Indeed, when, in the 1944 case of Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 214 a
majority of the Court called thirty-six hours of continuous relay interrogation "inherently coercive," it evoked a powerful dissent by three Justices who severely criticized
the majority for departing from the traditional "voluntariness" test. 215
In another coerced confession case, one decided in 1949 (Watts v. Indiana),
concurring Justice Robert Jackson warned that our Bill of Rights, as interpreted by
the Court up to that time, imposed "the maximum restrictions upon the power of
organized society over the individual that are compatible with the maintenance of
organized society itself'-good reason for not indulging in any further expansion
of them. 216
Were the 1950s a good time to impose the search-and-seizure exclusionary rule
on the states? When the California Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule on
its own initiative in 1955, 217 the cries of protest were almost deafening. Prominent
law enforcement officials called the exclusionary rule "the 'Magna Carta' for the
criminals" and "catastrophic as far as efficient law enforcement is concerned" and
warned that it had "broken the very backbone of narcotics enforcement. " 218
What of the 1930s? In 1935 Governor Herbert Lehman opened a conference on
crime by warning: "There is no question that in recent years there has come a
substantial increase in organized crime. The professional criminal has become
bolder. . . . We must take steps to increase the certainty of punishment following
crime. . . . We must have fewer legal technical loopholes in trials and appeals. "219
The New York gathering on crime was not a unique event in those troubled
times. The U.S. attorney general also called a conference on crime, and similar
conferences were held in various states. 220 The public was so alarmed by the apparent increase in crime that a U.S. Senate investigating committee, chaired by Royal
Copeland of New York, scoured the country for information and advice that could
lead to a national legislative solution. 221 At these 193 3 congressional hearings,
witnesses attacked virtually every procedural safeguard found in the Bill of Rights. 222
Going back still further, in 1931 the famous criminologist Harry Elmer Barnes
voiced fear that the repeal of prohibition would trigger "an avalanche of crime"-as
thousands of crooks, chased out of the booze business, would return to their old
rackets. 223 He warned that "the only effective check we can think of . . . would be
to turn our cities over for the time being to the United States Army and Marines. " 2 24
Transferring the Marines from Central America to the streets of Chicago, added
Barnes, "might not only promote the checking of the crime menace but also solve at
one and the same time our diplomatic relations with Central America. " 22 5
"Every generation supposes that its own problems are new, unknown to its
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forefathers." 226 To most of those who lived during that period, the 1930s (as usual)
was not a time for strengthening the rights of the accused. Rather it seemed to be a
period when (as usual) criminal procedural safeguards had already been stretched to
the breaking point.

Legislative Rulemaking vs. Constitutional Decision Making
I am sometimes asked ifl would still be in favor of the search-and-seizure exclusionary rule or Miranda if the legislature were to provide more effective, or at least
equally effective, protection for criminal suspects. My answer is the same one
Charles Black gave when asked whether he would still be against capital punishment
if he were sure it were being administered with perfect fairness, with divinely
scrupulous and infallible fairness. Professor Black replied that that was like asking
him, "Would you take trains if the earth were made flat, or would you fear they
would run off the edge?"2 27
In 1968 the Congress dealt with the confession problem. How? By "repealing"
both Escobedo and Miranda and offering nothing plausible in its place-nothing but
the old elusive, unruly, and largely unworkable "totality of the circumstances""voluntariness" test. 228
Judge Henry Friendly, the most powerful critic of the Warren Court's criminal
procedure cases, warned that "the situation with which the Court was confronted in
Miranda was sufficiently disturbing that those of us [who criticize the case] ought to
search hard for alternatives rather than take the easy course of returning simply to the
rule that statements to the police are admissible unless 'involuntary. "' 229 But Congress did take that easy course.
One might say that Congress pretended that Miranda never happened because
it believed that violations of that case rarely if ever produced an untrustworthy
confession. But the 1968 Congress also legislated in another area-lineups.
As discussed earlier, 230 a year after Miranda the Court at long last turned its
attention to the problem of misidentification-a matter of serious concern in the
administration of justice. "The problem here is not that of releasing an obviously
guilty defendant because of the system's failure to respect his rights . . . [but] one
of convicting the innocent." 231
Although the Court dealt with the problem of misidentification by applying the
right to counsel to lineups, this may not have been the best way to deal with the
problem. It certainly is not the only way to do so. For example, in order to ensure
that lineups are fairly conducted, a legislature might require that they be photographed and videotaped and that these records be produced in court. Or a legislature
might remove identification procedures entirely from the police and place them in
the hands of an expert and neutral administrative agency.
What alternative device did the Congress choose? None. It simply enacted a law
purporting to repeal the lineup decisions. 232 I share Francis Allen's view that the
congressional response (or lack of response) to this critical problem was "deplorable."233
It is sometimes said that the Warren Court's activism in the criminal procedure
area removed both the incentive and opportunity to deal with these matters by
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legislative reform. Indeed, Chief Justice Warren Burger once said that "the continued existence of [the exclusionary rule] inhibits the development of rational alternatives. " 234 But it is hard to take this argument seriously.
For many decades a large number of states had no exclusionary rule, yet none of
them developed any meaningful alternative to the rule. Some forty-seven years
passed between the time the federal courts adopted the exclusionary rule and the
time the Court finally imposed the rule on the states, but in all that time none of the
twenty-four states that still admitted illegally seized evidence on the eve of Mapp 235
had developed an effective alternative to the rule.
In short, a half-century of post-Weeks "freedom to experiment" with various
ways to discourage police misconduct did not produce any meaningful alternative to
the exclusionary rule anywhere.
One critic of the exclusionary rule has maintained that no alternative to the
exclusionary rule will emerge until the rule is abolished because "(s]o long as we
keep the rule, the police are not going to investigate and discipline their men, and
thus sabotage prosecutions by invalidating the admissibility of vital evidence. " 236
But this argument is not persuasive. How does the fear of "sabotaging" prosecutions
inhibit law enforcement administrators from disciplining officers for committing the
many unlawful searches that tum up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is
made, and about which the criminal courts do nothing?
To be sure, there is no shortage of theoretically possible ways, aside from the
exclusion of evidence, to make the Fourth Amendment viable. But various commentators have called attention to the need for an effective alternative to the exclusionary rule and underscored the inadequacies of existing tort remedies or criminal
sanctions against transgressing police since the 1930s. 2 37 The problem is not a lack
of imagination or intellectual capacity. Rather it is a lack of political will.
Is there any reason to believe that today's or tomorrow's politicians are, or will
be, any less fearful of crime and any more concerned about protecting people under
investigation by the police than the politicians of any other era? Is there any reason
to think that the lawmakers of our day are any more willing than their predecessors to
invigorate tort and criminal remedies against law enforcement officials who commit
excesses in their overzealous efforts to contend with "criminals" and "suspected
criminals"?

Was the Warren Court's Revolution in American
Criminal Procedure Bound to Fail?
Craig Bradley has forcefully argued that the Warren Court's revolution in criminal
procedure has failed and that, given the inherent limitations of the judicial process,
was bound to fail-"no Supreme Court, no matter how competent and regardless of
its political leanings, could have done much better. " 238 Observes Bradley:
[I]n the area of criminal procedure, unlike any other field of Supreme Court
endeavor, the doctrine must be clear, it must be complete, and it must be stable.
It is in these respects that criminal procedure law has failed. The usual leisurely
manner of constitutional decision making where the Supreme Court announces
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a rule one year and then answers the questions to which that rule gives rise over
the next fifteen or twenty years is inappropriate in this field, where the police
need clear guidance and where the penalty for police mistakes is high. . . .
. . . The Court is never, by its nature, able to sit back and decide, apart
from the cases before it, what the entire body of confession or search law should
be like or to examine comprehensively what police behavior, in terms of arrest,
booking, interrogation, identification procedures, and so on, is reasonable and
what is not. A case-specific system necessarily leads to a patchwork system and to
resulting confusion on the part of everyone involved in the process. . . .
. . . The worst problem with the case method . . . is that it is not forward looking. It does not allow that Court, as an ordinary rulemaking body
would, to anticipate future cases and to craft its rules, and the exceptions to those
rules, with such cases in mind. Thus the Court is invariably left in the position
of declaring a partial rule, such as the rule [about] when questioning must cease
upon a suspect's invocation of the right to silence, that fails to deal adequately
with the majority of subsequent cases that present related issues. . . . 239

Few, if any, would deny that in the field of criminal procedure legislative
rulemaking has advantages over constitutional decision making. But are the courts
supposed to do nothing in the absence of legislative rulemaking? A legislature never
has to act, but a court does; it must decide the case at hand.
I think there is much truth in Anthony Amsterdam's observation that "[t]he
judicial 'activism' that [the Court's conservative critics deplored a generation ago],
usually citing the Court's 'handcuffing' of the police, has been the almost inevitable
consequence of the failure of other agencies of law to assume responsibility for
regulating police practices. " 240 As the late Herbert Packer said of the Warren Court's
revolution in criminal procedure at a time when it was still taking place, "it is naive
or disingenuous to expect the Court to hold its hand when its hand is the only one
raised or raisable. "241
Professor Packer called the Warren Court's landmark decisions "moves of
desperation"-there was a law-making vacuum into which the Court felt it had to
rush. Nobody else was policing the police, so the Justices felt they had to do so. 242
It is easy enough to poke holes in this development, observed Packer, but what
is the alternative? "If we can look nowhere else but to the courts," wrote Packer,
"it is silly to ask whether the courts are doing an optimal job. One might as
well ask whether surgery is optimally undertaken with a carving knife without
revealing that on the particular occasion. the surgeon has no other instruments at his
disposal. " 243
The Warren Court did not accomplish nearly as much as its supporters hoped
and its many critics in and out of law enforcement circles feared. But I for one am
grateful that for a time the Supreme Court used its judicial resources in a determined
effort "to alter significantly the nature of American criminal justice in the interest of
a larger realization of the constitutional ideal of liberty under the law. " 244
Some day, perhaps (but not, I am afraid, in the lifetime of anyone now reading
this book), the Court will be able to put down its carving knife in favor of the
legislature's scalpel. In the meantime, it is comforting to know that, although
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battered and bruised, most of the Warren Court's famous precedents remain in
place-waiting for a future Court to reclaim the torch. 24 5
There is a distinct possibility, of course, that another Supreme Court will not
reclaim the torch (at least not for a long time). Even so--"[b]y reason of what the
Warren Court said and did, we now perceive as problems what too often were
not seen as problems before. This is the dynamic of change, and that fact may
well be more significant than many of the solutions proposed by the Warren
Court." 246
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24. Pye, "The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure," 67 Mich. L. Rev. 249, 256
(1968). See also Allen, supra note 3, at 523, pointing out that although charges of
inequality have not been confined to the criminal law, but have encompassed nearly every
aspect of society, such charges "possess an even sharper bite when they are hurled at a
system that employs as its sanctions the deprivation of property, of liberty, and, on
occasion, of life itself."
25. Pye, supra note 24, at 256.
26. Packer, "The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us," 57 f. Crim. L., C. & P.S.
238, 240 (1966).
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"contracted" Gideon is debatable. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), applied
Gideon to instances where defendant is imprisoned for any offense, but Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367 (1975), held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require only that
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reading of Gideon in one respect (Argersinger), but fell short in another (Scott).
28. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
29. Id. at 492.
30. For a summary of the wide disagreement over the meaning of Escobed(}-and
over what it ought to mean-see Kamisar, Police Interrogation and Confessions: Essays in
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31. About half of all felony defendants are indigent; in some urban jurisdictions the
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32. See Kamisar, "Has the Court Left the Attorney General Behind?-The BazelonKatzenbach Letters on Poverty, Equality and the Administration of Criminal Justice," 54
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Ky. L.J. at 499, 506-o7.
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35. Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate on the Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 327 (1993).
36. See Baker, "Miranda": Crime, Law and Politics 109 (1983).
37. Id.
38. See Brief for the State Governments, Amici Curiae, 2-3, 16, 21-23, Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
39. Id. at 24-2 5 (emphasis added).
40. Miranda "plunge[d] the Court into an ocean of abuse" and made it "one of the
leading issues of the 1968 Presidential campaign." Lieberman, Milestones-200 Years of
American Law 326 (1976).
41. Miranda, one commentator has observed, "must rank as the most bitterly criticized, most contentious, and most diversely analyzed criminal procedure decision by the
Warren Court." Abraham, Freedom and the Court 125 (4th ed. 1982).
42. At one point for example, 384 U.S. at 444, after defining "custodial
interrogation"-"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way"the Court dropped an obfuscating footnote [n.4]: "This is what we meant in Escobedo
when we spoke of an investigation which has focused on an accused." This footnote
suggested that "custody" and "focus" were alternative grounds for requiring the warnings,
but these are very different events and they have very different consequences. See
Graham, "What Is 'Custodial Interrogation'?," 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 59, 114 ( 1966);
Kamisar,"'Custodial Interrogation' Within the Meaning of Miranda," in Criminal Law
and the Constitution 335, 338-51 (1968); Stone, "The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger
Court," 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, 149. The likely explanation for footnote 4 was the
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Miranda Court's effort to maintain some continuity with a much-publicized and muchdiscussed recent precedent.
43. 384 U.S. at 489 (Goldberg, J.)
44. Id. at 488-89.
45. See Breitel, "Criminal Law and Equal Justice," 1966 Utah L. Rev. 1; Friendly,
"The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure," 53 Cal. L. Rev. 929 (1965);
Schaefer, The Suspect and Society (1967) (based on lectures delivered two months before
Miranda); Traynor, "The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention,
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Forty-Third Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, 1966 A.L.I. Proceedings
250-52.
46. Schaefer, supra note 45, at 9. See also Symposium, 54 Ky. L.J. 464, 521, 523
( 1966) (pre-Miranda), where Justice Schaefer expressed the view that effective enforcement of the criminal law "is not compatible with a prohibition of station house interrogation or with the presence of a lawyer during station house interrogation."
47. 1966 A.L.I. Proceedings, supra note 45, at 250 (emphasis added).
48. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,426 (1986). "Declining to adopt the more
extreme position that the actual presence of a lawyer was necessary to dispel the coercion
inherent in custodial interrogation," continued Justice O'Connor, "the [Miranda] Court
found that the suspect's Fifth Amendment rights could be adequately protected by less
intrusive means." Id.
49. See Kamisar, Essays, supra note 30 at 88-89.
50. See Ainsworth, "In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in
Police Interrogation," 103 Yale L.J. 259, 320-21 (1993); Allen, supra note 3, at 537-38;
Ogletree, "Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda," 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1826, 1842-45 (1987); Rosenberg and Rosenberg, "A Modest
Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions," 68 N.C. L. Rev. 69, 109-10 (1989);
Schulhofer, "Confessions and the Court," 79 Mich. L. Rev. 865, 880-82 (1981). But cf.
Cassell, "Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment," 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 387
(1996), maintaining that an electronic recording of police interrogation should be regarded as an alternative to Miranda.
51. At the March 1966 conference on Miranda and related cases, Chief Justice
Warren emphasized that FBI agents regularly informed suspects of their rights (although
the FBI warnings were not as extensive as the Miranda warnings) and that the FBI practice
had not imposed a substantial burden on law enforcement. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at
589. According to one Justice who attended this conference, "the statement that the FBI
did it . . . was a swing factor . . . a tremendously important factor, perhaps the critical factor in the Miranda vote." Id.
52. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The case is severely criticized in Dershowitz and Ely,
supra note 20.
53. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
54. However, as indicated in Harris and subsequently made clear in Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 ( 1978), "involuntary" or "coerced statements," as opposed to those
obtained only in violation of Miranda, cannot be used for impeachment purposes.
55. The Court subsequently held that a defendant's prearrest silence could be used to
impeach him when he testified in his own defense, Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231
(1980), and then, so long as he was not given the Miranda warnings, that even a defendant's postarrest silence could be used for impeachment purposes, Fletcher v. Weir, 455
U.S. 603 (1983). Both Jenkins and Weir distinguished Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. foo
(1976), which deemed it a violation of due process to use a defendant's silence for im-
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peachment purposes when the defendant remained silent after being given the Miranda
warnings.
56. See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U.S. 492 (1977). Cf. Stansbury v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1526 (1994) (per curiam). See
also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), explaining at considerable length why
the "roadside questioning" of a motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop is "substantially
less 'police dominated'" than station house interrogation and thus should not be considered "custodial interrogation."
57. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). For a close examination of this case see White, "Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry," 78 Mich. L.
Rev. 1209 (1980).
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Court invigorated the Massiah doctrine in several respects. See Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387 (1977) (often called the "Christian Burial Speech" case); United States v. Henry,
447 U.S. 264 (1980). But cf. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
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situation, see Kamisar, Essays, supra note 30, at 195-96.
64. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
65. See People v. Grant, 45 N.Y. 2d 366, 371-72 (1978).
66. Six years earlier, the Court held in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975),
that if a suspect asserts his "right to silence" (as opposed to his right to counsel), under
certain circumstances the police may, if they cease questioning on the spot, "try again"
and succeed at a later interrogation session. Although the Edwards Court tried hard to
distinguish Mosley, I do not think the two cases can be satisfactorily reconciled. See
Choper, Kamisar, and Tribe, The Supreme Court: Trends and Developments 1982-83
(1984), at 153-58 (remarks of Kamisar). The average person has no idea that different
procedural safeguards are triggered by saying "I don't want to say anything until I see a
lawyer" rather than "I don't want to say anything" or "I don't want to talk to the police."
67. 451 U.S. at 484-85 (emphasis added).
68. Sonenshein, "Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends,"
13 Loyola U. Chi. L.f. 405, 447 (1982). See also Rosenberg and Rosenberg, "Miranda,
Minnick and the Morality of Confessions," 19 Am. f. Crim. L. 1 (1991).
69. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
70. 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
71. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts' reinvigoration of Miranda's right to counsel
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element in general and the Minnick decision in particular have been explained on the
ground that while other features of Miranda "are for the benefit of the social underclass,"
the right to counsel before and during custodial interrogation is "a safeguard that benefits a
far broader segment of society." Rosenberg and Rosenberg, supra note 68, at 33.
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73. 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
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case. See Brief for the United States at 14, 19-20, 32-3 5. Since the agents of the Naval
Investigative Service had asked Mr. Davis, a member of the U.S. Navy, clarifying questions when he made an ambiguous reference to counsel and Davis had then made it plain
that he did not want a lawyer, all the government needed to win its case, and all it sought,
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82. See 417 U.S. at 444-45.
83. See Stone, "The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court," 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev.
99, l 18-19.
84. See 417 U.S. at 444.
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129. Wollin, supra note 127, at 843. See also Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
dissenting in Elstad, 470 U.S. at 357 and n.39.
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432 U.S. 98, 110-14, 117 (1977).
136. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110.
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when individuals shred their papers before putting them in the garbage but IRS agents
painstakingly reassemble them.
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